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IV.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal arises from a summary judgment for Defendant Brent Overson
("Overson"). Overson was, and still is, a Salt Lake County Commisioner, and this
lawsuit arose out of a heated political debate related to the County's expenditure of
public funds. In the Court below, Overson presented numerous compelling reasons
why, as a matter of law, judgment should be granted in his favor. Overson's arguments
were based on numerous defenses and privileges arising out of state constitutional,
statutory and common law, as well as federal constitutional law. This appeal also
presents procedural issues regarding motions under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendant, Brent Overson, therefore respectfully requests oral argument.

V.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court properly transferred this appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Therefore, jurisdiction over
this appeal is properly in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)G).
VI.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor of

Overson on the grounds that, because Overson's alleged statements arose in the
context of a heated political debate, and because his statements were in response to

1

prior attacks by the plaintiff-appellant, the alleged statements were incapable of
sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law?
a.

When reviewing a district court's entry of summary judgment, the

appellate court views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996).
b.

The appellate court reviews the district court's conclusions of law

on summary judgment for correctness. ]d.
2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by declining to order additional

discovery prior to ruling on Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment, when the plaintiffappellant had filed a Rule 56(f) Motion without a supporting memorandum and which
failed to show (1) that discovery could establish a genuine issue of material fact, and (2)
that any of the information he sought was in Overson's exclusive control?
a.

The grant or denial of a motion for additional discovery under Rule

56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court judge and will only be reversed for abuse of that discretion. See Reeves v. Geiqy
Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment

based on any of the alternative privileges and defenses raised in Overson's Motion for
Summary Judgment and not specifically addressed by the trial court?
a.

An appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on any

proper ground, even if the trial court based its rulings on a different ground. See
Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 1366,1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

2

VII.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution.
U.S. Const. Amend. I.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et. seq.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).

VIII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Background

The defendant-appellee, Brent Overson (hereinafter "Overson"), is currently a
Salt Lake County Commissioner, and has served as such since January of 1993. (R. at
48.) As a member of the Salt Lake County Commission, Overson excersises both
executive and legislative powers and duties. The County Commission ("Commission")
has the power to purchase and convey, in the name of the county, any real or personal
property deemed to be in the public interest. [Utah Code Ann. §17-5-242] The
Commission has the power to enter into contracts with municipalities, local
communities, other counties, and the State for the purpose of promoting development
of county resources. [Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-270] The Commission has the further
authority to expend county funds in a manner it deems advisable to carry out its duties.
[Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-271] Finally, as a Commissioner, Overson has the right and
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duty to perform "all other acts . . . which may be necessary to the full discharge of the
duties of the board." [Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-244]
South Mountain is a planned residential development in Draper, Utah. (R. at 38.)
The plaintiff-appellant, David K. Mast (hereinafter "Mast"), is a Utah real estate
developer. (R. at 38.) His company, U.S. General, Inc., is developing the Draper
Heights Subdivision, a 123-unit development on 74 acres close to the South Mountain
Development, (id-) Mast is in direct competition with South Mountain. (R. at 39.)
An October 28, 1996 article in the Desert News reported that Mast has "publicly
challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority, the Utah Transit Authority, Micron,
Salt Lake County, the City of Draper, and even the National Basketball Association. (R.
at 80.) The same article quoted Mast as saying: "I just feel I'm in a position that I can
not only say something about an issue but I can do something about it. I have money.
I can put ads in the papers. I can litigate if I have to." (id.) The ad referred to Mast as
"the Lawsuit-man," and stated that Mast has lost track of how many lawsuits he's filed in
his lifetime, (id.)
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah ("CTU") purports to be a Utah nonprofit
corporation. (R. at 40.) David K. Mast served as a director for Concerned Taxpayers of
Utah during 1992 and 1993. (R. at 44-45.) On August 1, 1995, CTU was involuntarily
dissolved or canceled. (R. at 46.) On March 28, 1996, CTU was reinstated as a Utah
nonprofit corporation by Judy C. Mast, David Mast's wife. (R. at 46-47.) Mast was
listed as the President of the reinstated corporation. (R. at 47.)
Mast signed and filed a GRAMA request on behalf of Concerned Taxpayers of
Utah, with respect to South Mountain, and was the County's personal contact with
4

regards to that request. (R. at 56-58.) In many letters to the County Commission and
statements to the press, Mast spoke on behalf of CTU. (R. at 72, 73-75, 77.) Mast also
admittedly funds most of CTU's endeavors himself. (R. at 81.)

2.

The Public Controversy Over the South Mountain Golf
Course Acquisition Proposal

On November 15, 1995, the Salt Lake County Parks and Recreation Citizen's
Golf Advisory Board reviewed three proposals for development of golf courses in the
south end of Salt Lake Valley. (R. at 94.) The three proposals included the Sharon
Steel site in Midvale City, a Jordan River location in Sandy City, and the South
Mountain course in Draper City. (R. at 94.) After discussion, the Golf Advisory Board
voted unanimously in support of the County pursuing the South Mountain proposal.
(Id.)
The Salt Lake County Parks & Recreation Division conducted a formal
evaluation of the merits of the South Mountain proposal and, on January 9, 1996,
submitted its evaluation to the Salt Lake County Commissioners. (R. at 82-136.) The
County's Project Evaluation called for the South Mountain Golf Course to be developed
on a "turn-key" basis, meaning that the South Mountain developer would complete the
course and then sell the finished course to Salt Lake County. (R. at 75,83.)
The South Mountain acquisition proposal led to a public hearing which was held
on Wednesday, April 17, 1996, at 12:00 p.m. in the Meadow Brook Golf Course
clubhouse. (R. at 138.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6, the County gave
advance public notice of this meeting. (R. at 138-140.)
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In early July of 1996, Salt Lake County made an offer of $6.5 million for the
South Mountain Golf Course. (R. at 141.) The South Mountain developers offered $8
million as their bottom price, (id.) The County refused to go any higher on its offer, and
the negotiations temporarily halted, (jd.) Then, in late July, 1996, the County received
information that South Mountain was entering an agreement to sell all or part of the golf
course to a private developer. (R. at 144.) The County decided to reopen negotiations
with South Mountain and eventually agreed on a purchase price of $7.9 million for the
South Mountain Golf Course, (id.)
At the end of September, 1996, the deal between Salt Lake County and South
Mountain fell through. (R. at 153,155.) The South Mountain developers instead sold a
half interest in their golf course to Crown Golf Properties of Chicago for $6 million. (Id.)
While the South Mountain proposal was alive, it generated a great deal of public
interest and debate. (R. at 72, 74, 138,141.) As early as January 3, 1996, news of the
proposed acquisition had begun to reach the public, and people immediately began to
express concerns and register their objections to the proposal with the Salt Lake
County Commission. (R. at 156.) One of the most outspoken opponents of the
proposal was David K. Mast. Mast sent several letters to the Salt Lake County
Commissioners expressing his objections to the South Mountain project. (R. at 73-75,
76-79, 158-171.) Mast was also quoted in several newspaper articles in which he
openly and adamantly criticized the County's decision to purchase the South Mountain
Golf Course. (R. 72-75, 172-173.)
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3.

Mast's GRAMA Request and the First "South Mountain"
Lawsuit

On March 6, 1996, David Mast filed a GRAMA records request with Salt Lake
County in the name of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. (R. at 174-175.) Mast's
request generally sought all documents related to the South Mountain acquisition
proposal. (JcL) On March 7, 1996, the County sent Mast a Notice of Extended Time for
Response to Records Request. (R. at 176.) The notice stated that Mast's request
involved legal issues that required analysis by legal counsel, and set a response date
for March 26, 1996. (Id.)
Because Mast's request involved such a large number of records, it was
necessary for the County to further extend its time for response. (R. at 58.) On March
22, 1996, the County sent Mast a Notice of Extended time which set April 11, 1996, as
the new date for the response to be completed. (]d.)
On March 28, 1996, the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah sued Salt Lake County.
(R. at 72.) The case was assigned to Judge Tyrone Medley of the Utah Third Judicial
District Court. (R. at 48.) The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was represented by
attorney Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (id.) On July 17, 1996, an Amended Verified Complaint
was filed in that action naming Salt Lake County, Brent Overson, and John Does 1 to
10 as defendants. (R. at 48.) The Amended Verified Complaint charged the County
with unlawfully withholding some of the South Mountain documents that Mast had
requested. (R. at 49-50.) It also alleged that Commissioner Overson had violated the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act by "on many occasions [meeting] with
representatives of South Mountain in non-public locations . . . . " (R. at 51.) Finally, the
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Amended Verified Complaint intimated to unethical behavior on the part of
Commissioner Overson by stating: "Commissioner Brent Overson, in particular,
appears committed to spending the money before the public can be informed. He has
been seen on TV wearing South Mountain shirts, indicating his enthusiastic support for
all the efforts of South Mountain." (R. at 51.)
By April 11, 1996, Salt Lake County had given CTU nearly all of its documents
related to the South Mountain acquisition proposal. (R. at 177-178.) Among those
documents disclosed were the 1992 Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements for
Commissioner Brent Overson. (]d.)
On November 6, 1996, Third District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley granted the
County's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (R. at 179-180.)

4.

Mast's Attacks Upon Overson's Character and
Reputation

During the heated debate over the South Mountain project, Mast did not restrict
his public statements to mere disagreements over policy. Mast's comments included
personal attacks on the character and reputation of Overson as well as repeated
threats of legal action. Mast conducted these attacks through (1) letters sent to the
County Commissioners and County Attorney, (2) charges of felony criminal behavior,
and (3) repeated accusations of illegal and unethical conduct made in the news media.
On February 22, ^996, Mast sent a letter to Overson regarding the South
Mountain proposal. Mast stated that Overson had been seen on a local news program
wearing a "South Mountain" golf shirt and expressed concern that Overson may have a
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conflict of interest. (R. at 78.) Finally, Mast threatened a lawsuit "if you and your fellow
commissioners want to perform without the best interest of the Utah taxpayer." (id.)
The letter was also sent to County Commissioners Randy Horiuchi and Mary
Callaghan. (id.)
On February 26, 1996, Mast sent a letter to County Commissioner Randy
Horiuchi. Mast stated "Like Commissioner Brent Overson, we are concerned that you
may have (among other things) a conflict of i n t e r e s t . . . . " (R. at 77.) This letter was
also sent to County Commissioners Brent Overson and Mary Callaghan and County
Attorney Douglas Short, (id.)
On March 2, 1996, an article about the South Mountain proposal appeared in the
Salt Lake Tribune. (R. at 74.) The article was titled "Leader of Taxpayers Group Says
Golf Course Is A Rip-Off." In the article, Mast complained that the price to be paid by
the County was exorbitant, negotiations were secret, and course construction should be
put up for competitive bid. (id.) The article identified Mast as "a contractor who has
worked on golf courses." (Id.) Mast also threatened a lawsuit if the South Mountain
deal went through as planned, (id.)
On March 4, 1996, Mast sent a letter to Overson with the March 2 article
attached. The letter was also sent to Randy Horiuchi and Mary Callaghan, Salt Lake
County Commissioners, and Douglas Short, Salt Lake County Attorney. (R. at 73.)
The letter called upon Overson to schedule a public meeting to hear public comment on
this issue and stated "[t]hat way at least, it will not appear as though you have
something to hide." (id.) Once again, the article threatened a lawsuit if the County did
not hold public meetings on the matter.
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On March 15, 1996, David Mast sent another letter to Brent Overson. In the
letter, Mast said that he was going to contact County Attorney Douglas Short to find out
how much money was being budgeted for South Mountain. (R. at 159.)
Mast stated: "If that amount for the golf course (including the maintenance facilities)
exceeds 3 millions [sic] dollars, then we will be filing a lawsuit immediately." (Id.)
On April 16, 1996, an article regarding the South Mountain proposal appeared in
the Deseret News. (R. at 72.) The title of the article was "County may be sued over
golf-course data." Of the commissioners, Mast charged "They're making a deal behind
closed doors where it can't be scrutinized." (id.)
On April 17, 1996, another article dealing with the South Mountain proposal was
published in the Salt Lake Tribune. The article quoted Mast as saying that South
Mountain's developers and the Salt Lake County Commission were engaged in a
"sweetheart" deal. (R. at 182.) Mast also complained that his freedom of information
requests were being "illegally thwarted." (R. at 182.)
On Thursday, August 22, 1996, CTU placed a full page ad in the Deseret News.
(R. at 184.) The bold-faced headline at the top of the ad stated:
S. L. COUNTY COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC
AND CONTINUES TO VIOLATE STATE LAW!
Below the headline, again in bold lettering, the ad stated:
BRENT OVERSON HAS HAD MANY SECRET MEETINGS WITH SOUTH
MOUNTAIN PRIVATE DEVELOPERS, TERRY DIEHL AND DEE
CHRISTENSEN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS!
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The advertisement continued . . .
BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC TO BELIEVE THAT THE
COUNTY WILL OWN THE GOLF COURSE PROPERTY AND THAT
PROPERTY IS INCLUDED IN THE $7.9 MILLION DOLLAR PURCHASE PRICE.
And further down:
BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE TAXPAYERS TO BELIEVE THE SOUTH
MOUNTAIN COURSE WILL NOT BE SUBSIDIZED BY TAX DOLLARS AND
WILL BE ENTIRELY FUNDED BY USER FEES.
The ad also accused Overson of illegal conduct:
BRENT OVERSON, IN OUR OPINION, HAS VIOLATED STATE LAW BY
MEETING MANY TIMES, SECRETLY AND BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, WITH
SOUTH MOUNTAIN DEVELOPERS. BRENT OVERSON FURTHER
DISREGARDS STATE LAW AND REFUSES TO TURN OVER GOVERNMENT
RECORDS. AS AN EXAMPLE:
- DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS -CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
The ad finally stated:
FOR THE PUBLIC'S INFORMATION, CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH
(CTU), HAS FILED SUIT AGAINST S. L COUNTY AND IT'S COUNTY
COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON, PERSONALLY
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah also made formal allegations that Overson
engaged in felony criminal conduct in connection with the South Mountain project. (R.
at 185.) Mast himself even asked the Utah Attorney General's Office to convene a
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grand jury to investigate Overson, and then published that fact in the Deseret News.
(R. at 188.)

5.

The Reply to Mast's Attacks

On August 26, 1996, a full-page ad appeared in the Desert News responding to
the August 22, 1996 charges. (R. at 189.) The advertisement was entitled "The Salt
Lake County Golf Program Presents the Facts." (|d.) The advertisement was signed by
Lynn Davidson, County Parks Board Chair; Brent Overson, Salt Lake County
Commissioner; Randy Horiuchi, Salt Lake County Commissioner; Tom Owen, County
Golf Advisory Chair; Mary Callaghan, Salt Lake County Commissioner; and Elaine
Redd, Mayor of Draper City, (jd.) Each one of the above persons duly authorized the
use of his or her signature on the advertisement. (R. at 190-196.) The ad never once
mentioned either CTU or David Mast. (R. at 189.)
On the day that CTU's full page ad appeared in the Deseret News, Overson
called a press conference. (R. at 197-198.) During the press conference, Overson
read a prepared statement, (jd.) Overson called CTU's full page ad "politically
motivated, mean spirited and a sham." (]d) Overson also made clear that David Mast
was behind the CTU ad, and that Mast was a real estate developer and a competitor of
South Mountain, (jd.) Finally, Overson stated that it was "a shame that a public official
has to subject himself to threats, personal lawsuits, lies or character assassination."

(Id.)1

1

1n his brief, Mast states that Overson "admitted" various statements which were made at the press
conference. However, Overson has only admitted those statements for the purpose of his Motion for
Summary Judgment without waiving the right to challenge them at a later time if necessary.
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On August 22, 1996, an article appeared in the Deseret News titled "Overson
fires back at critics." (R. at 187.) The article itself reported that Overson had previously
placed a full page ad in each of the Salt Lake Valley newspapers "vilifying" him for the
South Mountain project. (]d.) The article then went on to reflect Commissioner
Overson's purported reply to this ad, quoting Overson as saying "That ad is rife with
misstatements and bare-faced lies." (jd.) The article further quoted Commissioner
Overson as stating: "This is a competitor who is not happy with this transaction, this
'Concerned Taxpayers of Utah' is a ruse. It's strictly a front for David Mast. It's a
wonder anybody runs for public office when they have to be subject to this kind of
harassment." (Jd..)
A similar article appeared in the August 23, 1996 Salt Lake Tribune titled
"Overson Lambasts Newspaper Ad." (R. at 199.) The ad quoted Overson as saying
that CTU's previous full-page ad was "nothing more than a politically motivated, meanspirited sham." (jd.) The ad went on to state that David Mast is a real estate developer
who is building a subdivision next to South Mountain, (jd.)
B.

NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION
IN COURT BELOW
On November 8, 1996, Mast filed the Complaint in the instant action against

Overson. (R. at 3.) The Complaint alleges that Overson defamed Mast when he
responded to Mast's full-page ad by saying it contained "bare-faced lies" and by saying
that Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was a "ruse." (R. at 1-3.) The Complaint also
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contains claims based on the full-page ad titled "The Salt Lake County Golf Program
Presents The Facts." (id.)
On January 27, 1997, Overson field a Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. at 29-31.) Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment was based on several
constitutional, statutory and common law privileges and defenses to defamation claims.
Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed along with a Memorandum In
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 215-256.), and the
Affidavit of Terry Ellis in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at
32-214.)
On February 10, 1997, Mast responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment by
filing a Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. at 260-262.) Mast also filed the Affidavits of David K.
Mast and Scott Simons in support of his Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. at 264-275.) Mast did
not file a memorandum in support of his Rule 56(f) Motion and did not file any
memorandum in opposition to Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On February 18, 1997, Overson filed a Motion to Strike Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion
and Supporting Affidavits. (R. at 276-279.) Overson's Motion to Strike was based on
the grounds that (1) Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (1)(a),
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, because it was not accompanied by a supporting
memorandum of points and authorities; (2) Mast failed to meet his burden under Rule
56(f) of demonstrating that additional discovery would create a genuine issue of
material fact; and (3) Mast failed to demonstrate that the additional information he
sought through discovery was in the exclusive control of Overson. (R. at 276-277.)

14

On February 18, 1997, Overson also filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Rule 56(f)
Motion and Supporting Affidavits. (R. at 285-300.) The Reply Memorandum reiterated
the arguments outlined in Oversows Motion to Strike, and also argued that Overson
was entitled to summary judgment because Mast never filed a memorandum in
opposition to Oversows Motion and, therefore, all of the facts set forth in Overson's
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment were deemed admitted. (R. at 297298.)
On June 9, 1997, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge William
Thome regarding Oversows Motion for Summary Judgment and related pleadings. (R.
at 431.)
On August 1, 1997, Judge Thome issued a Memorandum Decision on Overson's
Motion for Summary Judgment and related pleadings (R. at 406-413.) Because of the
clearly political context in which the allegedly defamatory statements occurred, Judge
Thome granted summary judgment in favor of Overson on the ground that the
statements could not sustain a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. ( R. at 411.) In
a footnote, Judge Thome stated that Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion "does not require
comment as the discovery is not required as the statement is not defamatory as a
matter of law." (R. at 411.)

IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Overson on the
ground that his alleged statements were incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning
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as a matter of law. Since Mast did not attempt to controvert any of Overson's material
facts in support of summary judgment, Overson's facts are deemed admitted.
Furthermore, the disputes that Mast attempts to manufacture from the record are
irrelevant and immaterial to the basis for the trial court's grant of summary judgment
and, therefore, do not rise to the level of genuine issues of material fact. Because of
the fact that Overson's alleged statements arose in the context of a heated political
debate regarding the expenditure of public funds, and because the statements were all
made in response to prior attacks on Overson by Mast, the statements were, as a
matter of law, incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. The trial court was,
therefore, correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Overson.
The trial court furthermore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order
additional discovery before ruling on Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Mast
filed a bare-bones Rule 56(f) Motion without a supporting memorandum as required by
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Mast's motion and affidavits failed to meet his
burden under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to show that discovery could
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion and
supporting affidavits failed to demonstrate that any of the information he sought was in
Overson's exclusive control. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to order additional discovery prior to granting summary judgment for
Overson.
Even if it disagrees with the basis for the trial court's decision, this Court should
affirm the grant of summary judgment based on any of the other privileges and
defenses raised by Overson but not specifically addressed by the trial court.
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Specifically, (1) Overson is entitled to absolute executive officer immunity; (2) Mast
consented to the alleged defamation Overson; (3) Oversows statements are
constitutionally protected as pure expressions of opinion; (4) Overson's statements are
privileged as self-defense; (5) Overson's statements are privileged because they were
made to protect his legitimate interests; (6) Overson's statements are privileged
because they were made regarding matters of public interest; (7) Overson's statements
are privileged under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (8) Overson is
immune from this suit pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. On any one of
these grounds, this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Overson.

X.

A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF OVERSON ON THE GROUND THAT HIS ALLEGED
STATEMENTS WERE INCAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A DEFAMATORY
MEANING AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be

rendered forthwith "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Summary judgment is not precluded
simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is
genuinely controverted. See Hegler Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah
1980).
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On appeal from a trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
reviews the conclusions of law for correctness. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922
P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996).
While the factual context of this case is rich, the material uncontroverted and
undisputed facts lead inexorably to the conclusion that the alleged statements made by
Overson are incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. The trial
court was, therefore, correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Overson.

1.

There is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material Fact
Related to Whether the Alleged Statements Made by
Overson are Capable of Sustaining a Defamatory
Meaning,

a.

Mast did not at any time specifically controvert any of
Overson's material facts in support of summary judgment and,
therefore, all of Overson's material facts are deemed admitted.

The Utah Code of Judicial Administration sets forth the requirements for
responding to a motion for summary judgment. The code requires:
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
Rule 4-501 (2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added). Under this
rule, it is clear that a party must specifically respond to a Motion for Summary
Judgment, and where a party fails to do so, the statement of facts of the moving party is
deemed admitted.
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In responding to Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mast violated Rule
4-501. The only pleadings that Mast ever filed in opposition to Overson's Motion were
his 56(f) Motion, the Affidavit of David K. Mast, and the Affidavit of Scott Simons2."
None of Mast's papers even attempted to controvert a single one of Overson's material
facts. In light of this inexplicable failure, Overson's statement of facts is deemed
admitted and there can, therefore, be no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

b.

The factual disputes that Mast attempts to
manufacture from the record do not rise to the
level of genuine issues of material fact.

Realizing his complete and total failure to controvert any of Overson's material
facts, Mast, in his opening brief, attempts to manufacture a few disputed issues of fact
from within the record itself. Specifically, Mast mentions three areas which he claims
involve disputed issues of fact: (1) the nature and capacity in which Overson was acting
- official or private, (2) Overson's awareness of the difference between CTU and Mast,
and (3) Overson's motivation for making his statements regarding Mast. [ See
Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal ("Mast's Brief), at pp. 7-10.] However, Mast's
efforts in this regard are futile because, due to the fact that these disputes do not relate
in any way to the legal ground on which the trial court based its decision, none of these
insignificant points raise issues of material fact.
Mast quotes select portions of the June 9 hearing transcript in support of his
argument that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether Overson was acting in

2

After the pleadings were closed, Mast also filed two documents that he termed "Supplements." (R. at
332-337 and 374-387.) Judge Thome allowed the Supplements as part of the record. (R. at 414.)
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an official or private capacity when he made the alleged statements about Mast.
[Mast's Brief, at pp. 7-8.] However, this dialogue arose only in the context of a
discussion between the trial court and Mr. Gurmankin regarding the executive officer
privilege. It did not in any way relate to Oversows defense that his statements were
incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. Indeed, Overson's
capacity - official or private - has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on whether his
statements are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, because that defense
applies equally to all people regardless of whether they are governmental officials or
private citizens. See West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1999).
Therefore, this "dispute" cannot possibly be a genuine issue of material fact.
Mast also extracts pieces from the June 9 transcript in an attempt to construct a
factual issue regarding "the Commissioner's personal knowledge of the separate nature
of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. and the motivation of the Commisioner to directly and
indirectly imply false information regarding them." [Mast's Brief, at p. 8.] However,
once again, this issue, if it exists at all, only goes to the question of whether Overson
acted with malice. Indeed, the portions of the transcript quoted by Mast involved
discussion about the qualified privileges raised by Overson of which malice, or the
absence thereof, is a requirement. Malice, however, is not material to the defense of
incapability of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. See West, 872
P.2d at 1008. Therefore, this dispute as well cannot raise a genuine issue of material
fact with regards to the trial court's ground for granting summary judgment.
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2.

The District Court was Correct in Ruling that on the Uncontroverted
Factual Record, Overson was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of
Law on the Ground that his Alleged Statements were Incapable of
Sustaining a Defamatory Meaning.

One of the essential elements of a defamation case in Utah is that the
statements made by the defendant be actually defamatory. West, 872 P.2d at 10071008. Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a
question of law to be properly determined by the court. id. The guiding principle for the
court in making this determination is the statement's tendency to injure a reputation in
the eyes of its audience. ]d. A court cannot make this legal determination by viewing
individual words in isolation, but rather must carefully examine the context in which the
statement was made, giving the words their most common and accepted meaning, id.
In West v. Thompson Newspapers, the Utah Supreme Court held that, when
taken in context, the word "manipulate" was not capable of sustaining a defamatory
meaning. See, id., 872 P.2d at 1011. The Court based its decision heavily upon the
fact that the statement appeared in a newspaper editorial column where such
"exaggerated commentary" was expected by readers, and it was unlikely that any
reader would take such a statement at its face value in this context, id. at 1010.
In the case at hand, the trial court was correct in reaching the same conclusion
as the Utah Supreme Court in West. The trial court correctly noted that "[t]he
statements of both parties revolved around Salt Lake County's purchase of the South
Mountain Golf Course," and that "[t]he statements of the defendant were a piece of a
puzzle framed by politics, public spending, and an upcoming election." (R. at 409-411.)
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Indeed, even CTU's own court papers recognize that the South Mountain debate was a
"controversial matter" of great public import. (R. at 51-52.) Mast had previously made
numerous attacks upon Oversows character and reputation and published those
attacks in the press. The public would certainly expect Overson to respond to the
attacks and, in this context, such a response would not be considered defamatory. The
mere fact that Overson strongly responded to Mast's attacks does not suffice to create
defamation. As the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A publication is not defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or
embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because it makes a false statement
about the plaintiff... [the plaintiff] must establish that the statement was
more than sharp criticism . . . he must establish that it damaged his
reputation . . . in the eyes of at least a substantial and respectable
minority of its audience.
West, 872 P.2d at 1009. Given the context of Oversows alleged statements, Mast
could not possibly establish that the statements damaged his reputation in the manner
required by West.
In his appellate brief, Mast makes the argument for the first time that Oversows
alleged statements that Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers
of Utah," or that the CTU was a "ruse," amounted to nothing less than an allegation that
he was engaging in criminal conduct. [Mast's Brief, at pp. 10-14.] One can only
assume that Mast made this argument for the first time on appeal because he could not
make it with a straight face in the hearing before Judge Thome. The argument is
ludicrous and demonstrates Mast's desperation to stretch the facts of this political
debate into a cause of action for defamation. Indeed, Mast's argument flies directly in
the face of the Supreme Court's ruling in West. In that case, the court dealt with a
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newspaper editorial that accused a city mayor of attempting to "manipulate the press."
The statement in West could just as easily have been stretched into some form of
ambiguous implication of criminal conduct - for example, bribery or blackmail. However,
the court quoted the case of DiBemardo v. Tonawanda Publishing Corp.. 117 A.D.2d
1009, 199 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1986), for the proposition that "absent a clear assertion of
criminality, accusations of [using] political influence to obtain a benefit are not
defamatory." West, 872 P.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to
hold that there was no clear allegation that attempting to manipulate the press is
criminal or even ethically improper conduct, and that "[t]his combined with the general
context in which the statement appears, convinces us that the manipulation statement
could not have damaged West's reputation." See West,872 P.2d at 1010-1011.
Because of its tenuous nature and the clear authority to the contrary, Mast's newly
invented argument does not support an overturning of the trial court's decision.
Mast also makes the disingenous argument that Judge Thome did not consider
all of the evidence before him of Overson's alleged defamatory statements. Mast refers
to the written copy of Overson's prepared press conference statement found at pages
197 and 198 of the record and specifically to Overson's alleged statement that David
Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah" or" whatever
[he] called [him]self." [Mast's Brief, at p.5.] However, even a cursory reading of the
summary judgment hearing transcript makes it clear that Judge Thome was entirely
aware of the contents of Overson's press conference. (R. at 462-64, 467-74.) In fact,
Mr. Snuffer, Mast's counsel, expressly pointed out the prepared press conference
statement to Judge Thorne and walked him through it item-by-item. (R.a 1467-74.)
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There is no question that Judge Thorne considered the press conference in reaching
his decision to grant summary judgment. The mere fact that in his Memorandum
Decision Judge Thorne chose to focus more heavily on how the press conference
statements were subsequently reported in the newspapers cannot constitute reversible
error. This is especially true when the newspaper articles that were expressly
discussed by Judge Thorne contained language very similar to, and equally as strong
as, the language in Oversows prepared press conference statement. (R. at 187-188.)
Given all of the surrounding circumstances of this case, and the context in which
Overson's alleged statements were made, as fully documented in the record and
carefully considered by Judge Thorne below, it is clear that the trial court was correct in
holding that Overson's statements did not, and as a matter of law could not, damage
Mast's reputation. Indeed, the fact that Overson's statements were made in reply to
Mast's previous attack is, by itself, enough to make these statements non-defamatory
as a matter of law. See Fram v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1330
(W.D. Pa. 1974). The trial court correctly found that there was simply no defamation in
this case.

B.

THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER
FURTHER DISCOVERY BEFORE RULING ON OVERSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Mast repeatedly argues in his brief that the trial court should have granted his

Rule 56(f) Motion and stayed a ruling on summary judgment until he had been given
the opportunity to conduct more discovery. [Mast's Brief, at pp. 4-6,10-12 and 18.]
Although Judge Thorne did not expressly deny Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion, his action in
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granting Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment without ordering further discovery
had the practical effect of a denial.
The grant or denial of a motion for additional discovery under Rule 56(f), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge
and will only be reversed on appeal for abuse of said discretion. See Reeves v. Geiqy
Pharmaceutical Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

1.

Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion was Filed Without a Supporting
Memorandum in Violation of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Rule 4-501 (1)(a), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, unambiguously requires
that "[a]ll motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities . . . .M Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion in this case was
filed without a supporting memorandum of points and authorities. The trial court was,
therefore, justified in not granting Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion.

2.

Mast Failed to Meet His Burden Under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Show that Discovery Could Establish a Genuine Issue
of Material Fact.

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the movant making a Rule 56(f)
motion must explain how the continuance will aid in his opposition to summary
judgment. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In
explanation, "the party opposing the motion must present facts in proper f o r m . . . [a]nd
the opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature." ]d. (quoting 6
J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice fl 56.15[3] (2d ed. 1987)).
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Therefore, in order to prevail on his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast had the burden of showing
that a continuance and additional discovery would assist him in establishing a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. Mere conclusory allegations that additional discovery is
expected to produce matters essential to opposition of summary judgment "smacks of a
'fishing expedition1 for purely speculative facts," and courts will not grant a Rule 56(f)
motion based on such conclusory statements. See, Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. Instead,
the party filing a Rule 56(f) motion is required to specifically show that the information
sought is relevant, material, and how such facts will be useful in opposing the Motion
for Summary Judgment. See, Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City. 998
F.2d 1550, 1554-55 (10th Cir. 1993).

a.

Mast did not Satisfy His Burden of Specifically Showing how a
Continuance and Additional Discovery Could Assist Him in
Opposing Summary Judgment by Creating a Genuine Issue of
Material Fact.

Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion and supporting affidavits contained nothing more than
conclusory allegations that a stay and additional discovery would assist him in opposing
summary judgment. It is clear that the Rule 56(f) Motion was nothing more than an
attempt to launch a "fishing expedition" designed to harass and annoy Mr. Overson
rather than uncover information that would create a genuine issue of material fact.
Mast did not even try to satisfy his burden under Utah law, and the trial court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
In his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast made the bald allegation that he "does not have in
his possession, and cannot obtain without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and
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video taped [sic] news conference conducted by the Defendant in which he made
disparaging and false comments about the Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast made
absolutely no effort whatsoever to show how these items would create a genuine issue
of material fact or otherwise assist him in opposing summary judgment. Mast also
stated that he "cannot, without the conduct of discovery, fully challenge the allegations
of the Defendant that this was a 'privileged' communication." []d.] It is difficult to
imagine a more conclusory and speculative statement in support of a Rule 56(f) Motion.
To allow such a motion to succeed would not only have gone directly against the Utah
Court of Appeal's command in Callioux, but it would have rendered absolutely
meaningless any requirement that a Rule 56(f) movant specifically identify how
additional discovery would raise a genuine issue of material fact.
Mast's supporting affidavits provided no more specificity than his Rule 56(f)
Motion. In his affidavit, Mast made such bald conclusory allegations as: "I need to take
the deposition of Mr. Overson in order to oppose his allegation that the statements he
made were in 'self defense'." (R. at 266.) As another example, Mast stated: "The
deposition of Mr. Overson and the audio and video tapes are essential in order to allow
me to develop specific attacks on all of the alleged defenses of Mr. Overson." (R. at
266.) Once again, it is difficult to imagine more conclusory and speculative allegations
in support of a Rule 56(f) Motion. These allegations simply cannot satisfy Mast's
burden under Utah law. See, Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841-842.
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b.

Through his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast sought Discovery of
Information that is Irrelevant and Immaterial and Thus Could
not Have Possibly Assisted Him in Opposing Summary
Judgment.

In his affidavit, Mast made the following statement with regards to why additional
discovery was necessary:
I questioned [sic] the claim of Mr. Overson that he was acting under a
qualified "privilege" and that he deserves to have "immunity." I need to
take the deposition of Mr. Overson to challenge those claims, and
believe that if I am permitted to take his deposition I will be successfully
able to do so.
(R. at 265-266.) Mast also made the blanket claim that the deposition of Mr. Overson
was necessary "to allow me to develop specific attacks on all of the alleged defenses of
Mr. Overson." (R. at 266.) Futhermore, during the June 9 hearing before Judge
Thome, counsel for Mast stated that "I believe that - - that the deposition of Mr.
Overson himself is potentially dispositive of all of their defense." (R. at 444.)
The fact of the matter is that Mast could have obtained no information by
deposing Mr. Overson which would have allowed him to defeat any of the privileges
and defenses raised in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Any additional
discovery would have therefore been irrelevant and immaterial, and its only effect would
have been to harass and annoy Mr. Overson.
The defense which the trial court relied on in granting the Overson's Motion was
that all of Overson's statements are incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a
matter of law. Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is
an objective determination made by the court by examining the statement in the context
in which it is made. See, West v. Thompson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah
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1994). The key question for the court is whether a statement tends to injure the
plaintiffs reputation in the eyes of its audience. ]d. Oversows personal motivations are
not relevant to this issue. How then could the deposition of Mr. Overson have provided
any information whatsoever that would have been relevant to this determination? The
truth of the matter is that it could not. All that the trial court needed to make this
determination were the alleged defamatory statements and the context in which they
were made. This information was amply supplied by the pleadings and affidavits
already submitted. The deposition of Mr. Overson could have provided nothing more.

3.

The Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Supporting Affidavits Failed to
Show that any of the Information He Sought was in the Exclusive
Control of Overson.

In his brief, Mast argues that the trial court should have allowed additional
discovery so that Mast could attempt to gain access to the full text of Oversows press
conference including the ways in which Oversows statements were reported in the
media. [Mast's Brief, at p. 6.] However, because this information is not, and never has
been, in Overson's possession, let alone his exclusive control, Mast's argument must
fail.
In describing the Rule 56(f) standard, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
The mere averment of exclusive knowledge or control of the facts by the
moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show to the
best of his ability what facts are within the movant's exclusive
knowledge or control; what steps have been taken to obtain the desired
information pursuant to discovery procedures under the Rules; and that
he is desirous of taking advantage of these discovery procedures.

29

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840-841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added). In order to prevail on his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast must show that
the facts he seeks are in the exclusive control of Overson. jd. Rule 56(f) cannot be
used to obtain additional time to discover information that is publicly available or was
already available to Mast prior to the time that Overson filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment. See, Sage Realty Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 34 F.3d 124,
128 (2d Cir. 1994).
Mast based his Rule 56(f) Motion in part on the fact that he "does not have in his
possession, and cannot obtain without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and
videotaped news conference conducted by the Defendant in which he made
disparaging and false comments about the Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast himself admitted
that these tapes were not in the exclusive control of Overson. In his Affidavit, Mast
stated: "The full text of [Overson's] statement was recorded by various newspaper,
radio, and television outlets within the valley." (R. at 265.) These tapes were clearly
available through means other than discovery upon Overson. In fact, Overson's office
does not have any tapes or other recordings of the news conference in their
possession. (R. at 313-314.)
Mast further alleged: "I have not been able to obtain, and will not be able to
obtain without discovery, copies of the way in which this news conference was
subsequently reported on radio and television." (R. at 265.) Clearly, the contents of
radio and television reports were not in the exclusive control of Overson and, in fact,
Overson's office does not have the contents of such reports. (R. at 313-314.)
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Furthermore, through his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast was attempting to discover the
actual defamatory statements that he alleges Overson made. For example, in his Rule
56(f) Motion, Mast stated that he "does not have in his possession, and cannot obtain
without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and video taped [sic] news conference
conducted by Defendant in which he made disparaging and false comments about the
Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast reasserts this same argument in his appellate brief. [Mast's
Brief, at p. 6.] However, this is information that Mast should have had in his possession
before he even filed his Complaint. If Mast did not even know what was said by
Overson, this raises serious questions about (1) whether Oversows statements were
even published, and (2) whether the plaintiff did a sufficient investigation of the facts, as
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11, before he filed his Complaint.
Because the information he seeks could have been easily obtained by means
other than discovery upon Brent Overson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion.
C.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY RELYING ON ANY
ONE OF THE OTHER DEFENSES AND PRIVILEGES RAISED BY
OVERSON IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Utah law is clear that an appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on

any proper ground, even if the trial court based its rulings on a different ground. See
Embassy Group, Inc v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In his Motion
for Summary Judgment, Overson raised a total of nine (9) defenses and privileges. (R.
at 29-30.) Judge Thorne granted Oversows motion based solely on the ground that

31

Overson's alleged statements were incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a
matter of law - Overson's first defense. However, since there are no genuine issues as
to any material fact and Overson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of his
defenses, this Court can uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on
any of the privileges and defenses raised by Overson if it so chooses. See Embassy
Group, 865 P.2d at 1370.

1.

The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary
Judgment Because Overson has Absolute Executive Immunity from
this Suit.

The common law recognizes an absolute privilege for state and local executive
officers who publish defamatory matter in the course of performing their executive
duties. See, Fender v. City of Oregon City. 811 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. Or. 1993), affd,
37 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994); Schroeder v. Poaqe. 707 P.2d 1240, 1242-1243 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985); Kurat v. County of Nassau. 264 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 (1977). This privilege extends to statements
made by the executive to the news media. See, Fender, 811 F. Supp. at 558;
Schroeder 707 P.2d at 1243. The privilege also extends to statements made by
county executive officers. Kurat. 264 N.Y.S.2d at 128. Because the privilege is
absolute, no action for defamation can be maintained against the executive officer
regardless of any alleged malice or other improper purpose. See. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 591 comment d (1977); Schroeder, 707 P.2d at 1243 ("because the
privilege is absolute, Defendant's purpose in publishing the letter is irrelevant").
Therefore, because Overson published the alleged defamatory statements in the
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course of performing his duties as a county executive official, there can be no recovery
by the plaintiff as a matter of law.
It is unquestionable that any alleged defamatory statements were made by
Commissioner Overson in the course of performing his executive duties. The Salt Lake
County Commission acts as the legislative body for the County, and also in various of
its duties acts as the executive in administering County affairs. Cottonwood City
Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 1972).
Therefore, Overson functions as both a legislative and executive official of Salt Lake
County. The South Mountain project directly involved numerous branches of the Salt
Lake County Government. It likewise involved the Commissioners1 legislative and
executive duties to acquire real estate, enter contracts, and spend County funds. See,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-5-242, 17-5-270, and 17-5-271. Mast's initial attacks were made
directly against Oversows performance on the South Mountain project, and accused
Overson and the Commission of illegal and unethical behavior when acting as County
Commissioner. Oversows responses were aimed directly at refuting these attacks and
ensuring the public that there was no impropriety concerning the South Mountain
project. These limited statements to the press were clearly within the scope of
Oversows executive duties. See, Fender, 811 F. Supp. at 558; Schroeder, 707 P.2d at
1243.
Overson is clearly entitled to absolute executive immunity for the alleged
defamatory statements. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.
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2.

The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of
Summary Judgment because Overson's Statements are
Absolutely Privileged Due to the Fact that Mast
Consented to their Publication.

Cases have consistently held that consent is an absolute defense or privilege to
a defamation action. See, Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 n. 4 (Utah 1988); Rover v.
Steinberg, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 583 (1977); David A. Elder, Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide § 2:2 at 2-3 (1993). Since
it is an absolute privilege, the defendant is absolved totally of liability, and the Plaintiff is
precluded from attempting to circumvent the defense by alleging malice or falsity.
Rover, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 504; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583 comment f at 242
(1977); Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide § 2:2 at 3. The consent given by the Plaintiff
does not have to be express, but can rather be shown by "words or conduct...
reasonably understood to be intended as consent. . ." Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide §
2:2 at 5.
The Rover case dealt with a discharged plaintiff who had publicly challenged his
former employer to "prove" the truth of the charges leading to his dismissal. The court
held that this challenge "constituted nothing less than a request for the publication of
the evidence upon which [the employer] based their charges." Rover. 153 Cal. Rptr. at
503. The Court held that since the plaintiff impliedly consented to the subsequent
publication by the defendant, the statements were absolutely privileged, and the plaintiff
could not maintain his action. In the case at hand, Mast's prior public attacks upon
Overson amounted to nothing less than a public challenge. Mast continually called for
public debate over the South Mountain acquisition issue. Furthermore, when Mast
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publicly accused Overson of illegal and unethical conduct, he had to fully expect that
Overson would respond in order to protect his reputation. Because he impliedly
consented to the measured reply by Commissioner Overson, the Plaintiff cannot now
come to the Court claiming defamation. As one court stated: "[a] man who commences
a newspaper war cannot subsequently come to the court as plaintiff to complain that he
has had the worst of the fray." Havcox v. Dunn, 104 S.E.2d 800, 812 (Va. 1958).
The policy behind the consent privilege applies with strong force to the facts of
this case. The primary function of the consent defense is to prevent a plaintiff from
"creating" a libelous publication by inviting or inducing indiscretion and thereby laying
the foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain. See, Defamation: A Lawyers
Guide § 2:2 at 5. Allowing plaintiffs like Mast to recover for defamation would
encourage people to intentionally attack another and then sue for defamation when that
person defends himself. This is the exact situation the consent privilege was created to
avoid. This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial Court's grant of summary
judgment.
3.

This Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary
Judgment Because Overson's Alleged Defamatory Statements were
an Expression of Pure Opinion Absolutely Protected by the Utah
Constitution.

Article I, Section 15, of the Utah Constitution provides, in part, "No law shall be
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." As the Utah
Supreme Court has noted, "expressions of opinion are the mainstay of vigorous public
debate. Without opinion, such debate is virtually non-existent." West v. Thompson
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Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1014 (Utah 1994). The court went on to state that
"[b]ecause expressions of pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas, and because
such expressions are incapable of being verified, they cannot serve as a basis for
defamation liability." ]d. at 1015. Thus, Article I, Sections 1 and 15, of the Utah
Constitution protect expressions of opinion, id. That protection can only be lost when
the opinion states or implies facts that are false and defamatory, id.

a.

The Alleged Defamatory Statements are Pure Expressions of
Opinion Which are Constitutionally Protected.

The following factors are used by the court in distinguishing statements of
actionable fact from non-actionable opinion: (1) the common usage or meaning of the
words used; (2) whether the statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or
false; (3) the full context of the statement - for example the entire article or column - in
which the defamatory statement is made; and (4) the broader setting in which the
statement appears. West, 872 P.2d at 1018. Applying these criteria, it is absolutely
clear that the alleged defamatory statements are actually statements of pure nonactionable opinion.
In this case, the latter two factors are the most compelling. When one looks at
the third factor - the full context of the statements - the statements are clearly opinion.
Commissioner Overson's remarks in the newspaper articles are clearly made in an
attempt to defend himself. Even the titles of the two articles suggest that these
statements are a defensive response rather than a direct attack on Mast and the CTU.
(R. at 187-188, and 199.) When viewed in this defensive context, it must be absolutely
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clear to any reasonable reader that Oversows statements are opinion. This becomes
even more clear in light of the fourth factor - the broader setting in which these
statements were made. It is crucial to remember that this entire incident arises directly
out of a hotly contested and openly debated political issue. The Utah Supreme Court
has recognized that "[suppression of speech in this context is always subject to
exacting constitutional scrutiny." West. 872 P.2d at 1019. As the court stated: "By
entering the political arena, [the plaintiff] exposed himself to pointed, harsh, and even
defamatory criticism expressed in the form of opinion. Such expression of opinion must
be permitted in the arena of political debate." West. 872 P.2d at 1020.
This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Overson.

4.

The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of
Summary Judgment Because Any Alleged Defamatory
Statement was Made by Overson in Self-Defense and is
Thus Privileged as a Matter of Law.
a.

As a Matter of Law, the Qualified Privilege of Self Defense
Extends to All of the Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by
Overson.

When a person is attacked in the press, he or she has a qualified privilege to
respond in kind, and any statement so made, even if defamatory, is not actionable so
long as he or she does not respond with malice or excessive publication. See, Gregory
v. Durham Co. Board of Education, 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N C. 1984); Phifer
v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871-872 (Wyo. 1968); Rodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood
Hospital Medical Center. 545 N.E.2d 979, 984-985 (III. Ct. App. 1989); Restatement
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(Second) of Torts § 594 comment K at 267 (1977); W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and
Keeton on The Law of Torts $ 115 at 825 (5th ed. 1984); see also Havcox v. Dunn, 104
S.E.2d 800, 810-813 (Va. 1958) ("A man who commences a newspaper war cannot
subsequently come to the court as plaintiff to complain that he has had the worst of the
fray."). This privilege includes the response that the plaintiff is a "liar" or that his prior
statements were "lies." See, Gregory, 591 F. Supp. at 156; Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 594 Comment k at 267 (1977); Prosser and Keeton § 115 at 825; see also
Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1562 (4th Cir. 1994).
In this case, as a matter of law, all of the alleged defamatory statements were
made by Overson in direct response to earlier attacks committed by Mast and CTU.
For example, all of the alleged defamatory statements came after the full-page
newspaper ad accusing Overson of illegal and unethical conduct by misleading the
public and conducting "secret meetings." (R. at 184.) Oversows statement that the ad
contained "bare-faced lies" is a direct response to the ad, and is the kind of response
which has repeatedly been held to be privileged self-defense. See, Gregory, 591 F.
Supp. at 156; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 comment k at 267; Prosser and
Keeton § 115 at 825. Oversows statement that Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was a
"ruse" is likewise a direct response to the prior attacks made by Mast and the CTU.
Mast was bringing these charges to the public under the name of Concerned Taxpayers
of Utah without disclosing that he himself was a real estate developer with a personal
pecuniary interest in the dispute. As a matter of self-defense, Overson clearly had the
right to bring this to the public's attention. Finally, the full-page ad titled "The Salt Lake
County Golf Program Presents The Facts" was clearly an attempt by all of those who
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signed it to set the facts straight and defend the actions of Salt Lake County and
Commissioner Overson. (R. at 189.)
The uncontroverted record, therefore, establishes that all allegedly defamatory
statements were made by Overson in self-defense, and are thus privileged as a matter
of law.

b.

Overson did not Abuse the Privilege through Malice or
Excessive Publication, and, Therefore the Plaintiffs Claim
Must Fail as a Matter of Law.

Unlike the absolute privileges discussed previously, the privilege of self defense
is a qualified privilege which can be defeated upon a showing of malice or excessive
publication on the part of the defendant. See, Brehanvv. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49,
58 (Utah 1991). In order to defeat a claim of qualified immunity, the Plaintiff must show
"common law malice" rather than the constitutional "actual malice." Brehanv. 812 P.2d
at 59. Common law malice is a term which denotes "personal hostility" or "ill will." id.
To prove common law malice, Mast must show that Overson published the words with
"an improper motive such as a desire to do harm," or that he "did not honestly believe
his statements to be true

" Oqden Bus Lines v. KSL Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah

1976).
In the absence of proof that a communication was published with actual malice,
"it is within the power and duty of the courts to say, as a matter of law, that the motive
of the publication was without malice." Oqden Bus Lines. 551 P.2d at 225. Therefore,
in these circumstances, the question of malice can be determined as a matter of law.
In this case, the uncontroverted record establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did
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not act maliciously in defending himself. In view of the indisputable context in which
Overson's statements were made, it would be impossible for Mast to show that Overson
acted with malice. First of all, the uncontroverted record clearly shows that all of
Oversows statements were made in good faith belief as to their truth. Overson referred
to statements made in CTU's full-page advertisement as "bare-faced lies." (R. at 187.)
The uncontroverted record shows that Overson did have a good faith basis for believing
that several statements in the ad were in fact false. For example, CTU's ad claimed
that Overson was disregarding state law by refusing to turn over disclosure statements
and campaign contributions. (R. at 184.) In fact, indisputable evidence supports
Oversows good faith belief that the county did in fact give Mast and CTU Oversows
Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements. (R. at 178.) Furthermore, CTU's
advertisement stated that Overson was misleading the public that the County would
own the golf course property and that the property was included in the $7.9 million
purchase price. (R. at 184.) Once again, indisputable evidence supports a good faith
belief on the part of Commissioner Overson that this statement was in fact false. The
real estate purchase contract for the South Mountain project itself states: "Purchase
price to include 248 (more or less) acres of land as described by attached survey
provided by Seller, but not less than the total acreage needed for the golf course."
(R. at 148.) Finally, CTU's ad charged Overson with violating state law by meeting
many times secretly and behind closed doors with South Mountain developers. (R. at
184.) Once again, this statement was in fact false. Judge Medley's dismissal, of which
this Court can take judicial notice, shows that Overson never violated the Utah open
meetings laws. (R. at 179-180.) In light of the uncontroverted record in this case, Mast
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cannot possibly show malice on the part of Overson. This Court can and should find as
a matter of law that he did not act maliciously in this case. See, Gregory v. Durham
County Board of Education, 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Rodriguez Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 545 N.E. 2d 979, 985 (III. Ct. App.
1989); Phifer v. Foe. 443 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1968).
Likewise, the uncontroverted record establishes as a matter of law, that Overson
did not "excessively publish" the allegedly defamatory statements. To avoid excessive
publication, reply "must reasonably focus on the audience which heard the attack."
Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC. Inc.. 37 F.3d 1541, 1563 (4th Cir. 1994). In this case,
Mast and CTU initiated attacks on Overson with articles and advertisements in the Salt
Lake Tribune and the Deseret News, letters to the other Salt Lake County
Commissioners and the Salt Lake County Attorney, and formal charges made before
the Third District Court and the Utah Attorney General's Office. Overson replied to this
attack with statements appearing in the same two newspapers. Overson showed great
restraint in limiting his replies directly to contradicting Mast's and CTU's previous
attacks. Overson did not delve into irrelevant aspects of Mast's private life. Overson
instead "targeted [his] message toward those persons in whose eyes [his] reputation
already had been (or soon would be) sullied." Foretich. 37 F.3d at 1563.
Therefore, the uncontroverted record clearly establishes that Overson did not
abuse his qualified privilege of self-defense, and thus this ourt should uphold the trial
court's grant of Summary Judgment.
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5.

The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary
Judgment Because any Allegedly Defamatory Statements are
Subject to a Qualified Privilege Due to the Fact that They were Made
to Protect a Legitimate Interest of Overson.
a.

Any Statements Made by Overson in this Case were Made to
Protect his Legitimate Interests, and thus Enjoy a Qualified
Privilege.

Apart from the personal privilege of self-defense, defendants in defamation
actions also enjoy a qualified privilege for defamatory statements made to protect their
own legitimate interests. See, Gregory v. Durham County Board of Education, 591 F.
Supp. 145, 156 (M.D.N.C. 1984). Utah has expressly recognized this privilege through
both case law and statute. See, Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991);
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3).
The same arguments that apply to the self defense privilege apply with equal
force to the privilege to protect one's legitimate interests. Overson certainly had the
right to protect his interests by responding directly to Mast's attacks, and thus he has a
qualified privilege for all of his alleged defamatory statements.
b.

Overson Did Not Abuse the Privilege Through Malice or
Excessive Publication, and Therefore, the Plaintiffs Claim
Must Fail as a Matter of Law.

As discussed previously in partX.C.4.b. of this brief, the uncontroverted record
establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did not abuse this privilege through acts of
malice or excessive publication. This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Overson.
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6.

The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary
Judgment Because any Alleged Defamatory Statements were Made
Regarding a Matter of "Public Interest" and Thus Overson Enjoys a
Qualified Privilege for Such Statements.

a.

The Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by the Defendant
are Subject to a Qualified Privilege Because They were Made
Regarding a Matter of Public Interest.

Utah has long recognized a qualified privilege against defamation liability for
statements made concerning issues of "public interest." Seeqmillerv. KSL Inc., 626
P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981); Qqden Bus Lines v. KSL. Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah
1976). This privilege applies regardless of whether or not the defendant is a member of
the news media. See Ogden Bus Lines, 551 P.2d at 224. In defining what constitutes
sufficient "public interest" for the privilege to apply, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
The 'public interest' privilege is applicable, at least, when public health
and safety are involved and where there is a legitimate issue with respect
to the functioning of governmental bodies, officials, or public institutions or
with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public funds.
Seeqmiller, 626 P.2d at 978. All of the alleged statements in this case arose directly
out of the Salt Lake County's proposed acquisition of the South Mountain Golf Course.
Both Mast and CTU publicly accused Commissioner Overson of improper use of public
funds and unlawful and unethical behavior as a County Commissioner. (R. at 184-188.)
All of Overson's statements were direct replies to these attacks and were aimed at
ensuring the public that there was nothing illegal or improper with the proposed South
Mountain project. Commissioner Overson's statements were clearly made in
connection with a matter of "public interest" and are thus subject to a qualified privilege.
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b.

Overson Did Not Abuse the Privilege Through Malice or
Excessive Publication, and Therefore, the Plaintiffs Claim
Must Fail as a Matter of Law.

As discussed previously in partX.CAb of this brief, the uncontroverted record
establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did not abuse this privilege through acts of
malice or excessive publication. This Court should, therefore, uphold the lower court's
grant of summary judgment for Overson.

7.

This Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary
Judgment Because, Under the U.S. Constitution, as a Public Figure,
Mast has not Sustained, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Sustain, his
Burden of Proving that Overson's Statements are Both False and
Made with Actual Malice.

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution places limits on the ability
of a plaintiff to recover for defamation when that plaintiff is considered to be a "public
figure." First of all, a public figure bears the burden of proving that the alleged
defamatory statements are actually false. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 775-776 (1986). Second, as a public figure, plaintiff also bears the burden of
proving that the alleged defamatory statements were made with "actual malice." Gertz
v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334-337 (1974). If the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
a genuine issue of material fact on either of these two issues, then his cause of action
must fail as a matter of law. See, Fram, 380 F. Supp. at 1338; Beard v. Baum, 796
P.2d 1344, 1353 (Alaska 1990); Rodriquez-Erdmann, 545 N.E.2d at 985.

a.

Mast is a Public Figure for the Purpose of Application of the
First Amendment to this Defamation Action.
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It is unquestionable, given the circumstances of this case, that the Plaintiff is a
"public figure" for purposes of this defamation action. In regards to this issue, the
United States Supreme Court has stated:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself oris
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited rage of issues.
Gertz. 418 U.S. at 351. The Court also described the public figure as someone who
"thrusts" himself" into the vortex of [a] public issue." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Since the
South Mountain acquisition was undeniably a "public controversy," and since Mast
voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of that issue, then, as a matter of law, Mast is a
"public figure" for the purposes of this case.

i.

The debate over the South Mountain acquisition is
undeniably a "public controversy."

A "public controversy" is a dispute that in fact has received public attention
because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants.
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications. Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert,
denied. 449 U.S. 898 (1980). "If the issue was being debated publicly, and if it had
foreseeable and substantial ramifications for non-participants, it was a public
controversy." ]d. 627 F.2d at 1297. Under this criteria, it is undeniable that the South
Mountain issue was a "public controversy" for constitutional purposes.

ii.

Mast voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of this
public controversy.
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Once the court has defined the controversy, it must analyze Mast's role in it.
Waldbaum. 627 F.2d at 1297. Mast either must have been purposefully trying to
influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of his position
in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. ]d. 627 F.2d at 1297. With this
standard in mind, it is absolutely clear that Mast "thrust" himself into the "vortex" of the
South Mountain controversy.
David K. Mast is known throughout the community as someone who continually
"thrusts" himself into public controversy. An October 28, 1996 article in the Deseret
News reported that Mast has "publicly challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority,
the Utah Transit Authority, Micron, Salt Lake County, the City of Draper and even the
National Basketball Association." (R. at 80.) The same article quoted Mast as saying:
"I just feel I'm in a position that I cannot only say something about an issue but I can do
something about it. I have money. I can put ads in papers. I can litigate if I have to."
(]d.) The ad referred to Mast as "the Lawsuit-man," and stated that Mast has lost track
of how many lawsuits he's filed in his lifetime. (]d.)
From the early stages of the South Mountain proposal, Mast was a vocal
opponent who did not shy away from making his opinions known in the press.
Numerous cases have held that a person becomes a public figure when they bring an
issue to the public attention by going to the press. See, Morgan v. Tice. 862 F.2d 1495,
1496 (11th Cir. 1989) (public figure plaintiff had criticized the defendant repeatedly, both
verbally and as a writer of a weekly column in a local newspaper); Fram v. Yellow Cab
Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("Fram intentionally sought
the press and the media to publicize his criticism of Yellow Cab's rate increase. Fram's
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activities qualify him as a public figure under Gertz."); Beard v. Baum. 796 P.2d 1344,
1353 (Alaska 1990); Rodriquez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center. 545
N.E. 2d 979, 985 (III. Ct. App. 1989).
It is unquestionable Mast was publicly trying to influence the outcome of the
South Mountain debate. Given these facts, Mast is clearly a "public figure" for purposes
of this case, and he, therefore, has the burden of proving both falsity and actual malice.

b.

Mast has not Satisfied, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Satisfy,
His Burden of Proving that Overson's Statements Were False.

As discussed above, Mast, as a public figure, has the burden of proving that
Overson's statements were false. Since all of the statements made by Overson are
either pure opinion or are undeniably true, as a matter of law, it is impossible for Mast to
meet his constitutionally required burden.
First of all, Overson's statements are matters of pure opinion and thus, as a
matter of law, can not be proven false. See, Supra, Part X.C.3. of this brief.
Furthermore, while Overson is quoted as saying that CTU's August 22 full-page ad
contained "bare-faced lies," as a matter of clear indisputable fact, CTU's full-page ad
did contain several falsities. See, Supra, Part X . C A b of this brief. As such is the case,
it is impossible, as a matter of law, for Mast to satisfy his burden of proving actual
falsity.

c.

Mast has not Satisfied, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Satisfy,
his Burden of Proving that Overson Made the Alleged
Statements with Actual Malice.
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Since Mast is clearly a public figure, he has the burden of proving that Overson
made the alleged defamatory statements with "actual malice," i.e., knowing or reckless
falsity. See, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334-337. Given the above arguments that Overson's
statements are actually true, it is certainly clear beyond any doubt that Overson made
his statements with good faith and reasonable belief in their truth. In light of the
evidence above, it would be impossible for Mast to show that Overson made his
statements with knowing or reckless falsity.

8.

The Court Should Grant Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment
Because he is Immune from this Suit Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
a.

Mast's Exclusive Remedy in this Case is Filing Suit under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides the exclusive remedy for a
plaintiff who is injured by a governmental employee's act or omission that occurs
"during the performance of the employee's duties within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(a). Such a plaintiff may not
bring any other civil action based upon the same subject matter against the employee
unless the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-4(3)(b)(i). The alleged defamatory statements were clearly made by Overson
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under the
color of authority. It is a Salt Lake County Commissioner's statutory responsibility to
purchase real property in the name of the County, (Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242), and to
expend County funds in a manner that the Commission deems advisable to carry out its
duties (Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-271). Mast and CTU engaged in public attacks that
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criticized the South Mountain plan and accused Overson of illegal and unethical
behavior while acting as a County Commissioner. Overson's replies were narrowly
tailored to a refutation of Mast's attacks and a defense of the County's conduct with
regard to the South Mountain proposal. The full-page advertisement titled "THE
FACTS" was duly authorized and signed by all three Salt Lake County Commissioners,
the Mayor of Draper City, the County Parks Board Chair, and the County Golf Advisory
Chair. This conduct was clearly within the scope of Overson's employment as a County
Commissioner. See, egu, Fender v. City of Oregon City, 811 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. Or.
1993), affd, 37 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994)(dealing with common law executive privilege);
Schroeder v. Poaqe. 707 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (dealing with common
law executive privilege).
As discussed in previous sections, the circumstances surrounding this case, and
the uncontroverted record before the Court, show as a matter of law that Commissioner
Overson's statements were made in self defense, and with a reasonable belief that
such statements were true. See, Supra, Part X.C.4 of this brief. Thus, as a matter of
law, there was no malice on the part of Overson. See, Gregory v. Durham County
Board of Education. 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
Therefore, Mast's sole remedy in this case is an action brought under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act
b.

Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Defendant is
Absolutely Immune from this Lawsuit.
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Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, "no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it
is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4).
As discussed above, the uncontroverted record establishes, as a matter of law,
that there was no fraud or malice on the part of Overson. Therefore, as a matter of law,
Overson is absolutely immune from liability.

XI.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, Brent Overson.
DATED:

April

j0

, 1998.

BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Jay D. Gurmankin
Richard D. Flint
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendants
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on April \Q , 1998, two true and correct copies of
the BRIEF OF APPELLEE BRENT OVERSON were hand delivered to the following:

Denver Snuffer, Esq.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH
"a non profit organization"

February 22, 1996
Salt Lake County Commissioner
Brent Ovcrson
Suite #N2100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

"ViarFax 468-3535"

Dear Brent
1 keep missing you by telephone* I believe you'll remember me from are past meetings concerning Salt
County's attempt to contractually require pre-determincd wages and benofits in the renovation of the Sak Palace
Convention Center of which, like our group, you strongly opposed. See attached complaint
We understand that you and fellow commissioner, Randy Horiuchi are pursuing a deal using Utah Taxpayers
money in which the County would purchase property in Draper from a local developer/contractor, South
Mountain Development, for approximately 13 million dollars. Then in turn, contract with the same
contractor/developer to construct a golf course and club house at an amount DOUBLE what we believe the
costs should be.
For your information, the golf course South Mountain has represented and started construction on is aTarget"
type golf course due to the unbuiklable terrain. In other words, a golf course with little fairway between tee
boxes and greens, therefore costing less to build!
In the interest of the Utah Taxpayer, we suggest the following:
1. Obtain an independent appraisal for the golf course property South Mountain intends to sell the County.
2. Request at least two public meeting to discuss the purchase price of the property South Mountain wants to
sell to the County.
3. With the blessing of the Utah Taxpayer, there should be a condition placed upon the purchase of the South
Mountain property, that being the construction of the golf course and club house be competently hid!
Another concern we have is, several months ago a number of our members seen you on the local news program
wearing a "South Mountain" golf shirt. Is it possible you have a conflict of interest regarding this matter?
Please advise.
Finally, be advised, our group would not hesitate filing a lawsuit against the County if you, and your fellow
Commissioners wants to perform without the best interest of the Utah Taxpayer*; Please govern yourselves
accordingly.

David K.
Chairman
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah
cncl.
cc:

^00S6
County Commissioner, Randy Horiuchi
County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH
a

a oon profit organization"

February 26,1996
Salt Lake County Commissioner
Randy Horiuchi
Suite #N2100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Re:

"Via Fax 468-3535rt

Draper Golf Course Property

Dear Randy:
I believe you to be in receipt ofxny letter of February 22,1996, see attached, sent to fellow Salt Lake
County Commissioner, Brent Oversou - and from that letter you should know our concern about your
dealings with South Mountain Development
For you to accept front row seating basketball tickets, costing hundreds of dollars from South
Mountain Developer, Terry Diehl, gives our group the impression you ate being induced by the same
developer the County is dealing with concerning its acquisition of die Draper golf course property in
tiie control of South Mountain Development
Like Commissioner Brent Overson, wc are concerned that you may have (among other things) a
conflict of interest and cannot now deal in clean hands with South Mountain and in the best interest of
the Utah Taxpayer, However, perhaps you were unaware of pending matters affecting South
Mountain when you accepted the gift
Presentiy, we would like to know what the County's intent is with South Mountain and its golf course
property. Does the County intend on dealing with them privately or in the open? Furthermore, does
the County intend for the public to competitively bid on the construction of the golf course, club house
and maintenance building • or just give that work to back to South Mountainforjwhatmay be an
exorbitant price at the expense of the Utah Taxpayer? Please advise.
Sincerely,

DavidlCMast
J
Chairman
/
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah
encl.
cc:

Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short -via
County Commissioner, Brent Overson
County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan

fioc-468-2622
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* C County
vi>iay Buy
rDraper Course
' • Continued from B-l
.site aa beautiful, challenging and
a good price because land is in'eluded. It also Alls a golf need in
the southeast part of the county
"He .has no idea what he's talkling about," Overson says, "It's not
like the commissioners went out
;and cut a deal."
4'Overton sari the county submitted two other possible sites lo
'lis Golf Advisory and Parka and
* Recreation boards and both recommended the South Mountain
site.
And competitive bids were never rui option, says Terry Diehl a
partner with Dee Christiansen in
the 1,700-home South Mountain
project Right now, the course is
60% complete snd it should open

in toe spring at ivvt, ne i ^ ,
'The county came to i
Vwc
said the only way we'd dc
tm a
turnkey basis/* says Dieiu. 4*urnkey is developer parlance for a
project sold when it is finished
and ready to operate. They fear,
another developer* might no^>
build the course in harmony withJ
the rest of the project
"We'll take care. Well have a
much more conscientious approach in looking after the whole
mountain, not just the golf
course," Dlehl says.
A clubhouse is not included In
the sale to the county because
South Mountain wants a commer- cul center that would include a
clubhouse with cart storage, a 60*"
b§d bed Mad breakfast, a restaurant with banquet facilities and 50
townhouse condominiums,
Diehi defends the "target",
style course as being environmentally sensitive. And hitting drives .
over ravines and scrub oak will,
challenge golfers on a course that
has a magnificent view of the Salt'
Lake Valley.
**lt keeps you from disturbing
the whole mountain and there's a

lot less maintenance, he says.
"And instead of planting 276
acres with grass, we'll only plant
90."
Lynn Larsen is project manager for the county's golf courses.
He says the South Mountain
course is a good deal for the county, its taxpayers and golfers. Combined with the county's new
course in Rlverton, the count*
fills golfers' needs in the south
county.
But building a golfcourse for
$3.5 million is impossible these
days. The Rlverton course cost $6
million and the Old Mill course,
where construction has just begun, will cost about $11.5 million,
Larsen adds.
Draper residents should be
happy for the county to take over
the course, says Councilvrom.ni
Melanie Danaie, who normally anguiahes over the growth up the
mountainside.
"My only concern is making
sure it remains an open space/*
she says. "When Terry and Dec
presented the plan, it could well
have been the Sierra Club."
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH
a

a non profit organization"

March 4, 1996
Salt Lake County Commissioner
Brent Overson
Suite #N2100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Re:

Draper Golf Course Property

Registered Letter

RECEIVED
MAR 0 a b a o
COMMISSIONER OVERSON

Dear Commissioner Overson:
In response to your comment I read in Saturday's, Salt Lake Tribune, reported by Jon Ure, see attached.
You were quoted as saying... "He has no idea what he's talking about". Respectfully, since we believe that
you are the one who does not know what he is talking about concerning the "target golf course being
proposed in Draper, may we suggest you schedule a public meeting to hear public comment concerning this
issue. That way at least, it will not appear as though you have something to hide!
If what you say is true, that the County is receiving a golf course at., "a good price becawe the land is
included"...then why is a target golf course that would cost much less than 4 million dollars a good price at
8 million dollars (without a clubhouse) such a good deal? Do you think your fellow Commissioners also
believe the land cost in Draper is not included in the 8 million dollar price to build the golf course and do
think they know that this golf course property is required to be dedicated to Draper City as "open space"?
For your information, we are not opposed to the County's desire to fund more user friendly, self sufficient
golf courses in the valley. Golf courses that are not two months less seasonable because of northern
exposure, at higher elevations and undesirable to intermediate and lady golfers. However, we are opposed
to secret deals made behind closed doors to purchase a less than desirable "target type" golf course without
public notice, scrutiny, and competitive bid process etc. All of which promotes waste in government
spending. Simply put, it would not be a good deal for the County to burden the taxpayers with a golf course
that would require subsidy from profitable golf courses. May we given the opportunity to prove our claim?
Finally, if you would like to avoid a lawsuit from our organization and truly care about the opinion of the
Utah Taxpayer, then we suggest at a minimum, the County hold public meetings concerning this matter,
then we will see who has no idea what he is talking about Will you accept the challenge? Please advise.
Sincerely,
sincerely,

s

David K. Mast
)
President
/s
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah
encl.
cc:

Salt Lake County Commissioner, Randy Horiuchi - via fax - 468-3535
Salt Lake County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan - via fax - 468-3535
Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short - via fax - 468-2622
A0058
4777 COMMERCE DRIVE - MURRAY, UTAH - 84107 - (801) 268-0420 - FAX (801) 268-1377
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH
"a non profit orglnlzatlou,,
March 15,1996
Salt Lake County Commissioner
Brent Oversoti
Suite #N2100
Salt Lake City, Utah S4190
Dear Brent:

"Via Fax 46S-3535*'

I am in your receipt of your February 21,1996 letter post marked March 8,1996. In response to your letter,
please be advised of the following*
Contrary to your comment.. "Salt Lake County was approached by Draper City ami South Mountain
Development"L. Terry Diehl of South Mountain Development is quoted as saying... "Salt Lake County
approached South Mountain and Draper City"— concerning the Draper Golf Course. So we are not sure who
we should believe Mr. Overson, and soli are wondering why Salt Lake County wants to spend up to 13 million
dollars for a second-rate golf course that should cost less than 3 million dollars to construct
In response to your statements "Golfers are literally paying for new courses to play on, and for major
improvements to existing courses".* If your statement is true; when you factor in substandard golf courses
that need subsidy to build, operate and maintain, the net result is unjust, ever inereasmg golf fees. T_ suspect it
w*« ihnt type nf thinking font ceased the thnost 100% increase m golf fee* since 1989

In Other words, if the

golf courses are self supporting then why the increase m golf fees? Nonetheless, we are pleased to learn from
your letter, before Salt Lake County will consider purchasing the Draper Golf Course, [the County] ...%>*//
ultimately be open to the scrutiny of three-quarters of a milium residents in Salt Lake County".- Thank you
for sharing mat information with us and we will plan accordingly.
For your files, I have attached literature from a top ten golf course design group,44Arthur Hill**- Included are
costs estimates and actual costs to build a "higLsid" 13 hole golf course, which if you average 95 and 96 costs
amounts to $3,452,031. Again, be advised, a "target type" golf course will cost much, much less*
I am going to have our attorney contact County Attorney, Douglas Short to find out the amount the County is
budgetmg for the Draper Golf Course. If that amount for the golf course (including the maintenance facilities)
exceeds 3 millions dollars, then we will be filing a lawsuit immediately. We understand that the real property
for the Draper Golf Course ts required to be donated from a pool of dedicated open space belonging to Draper
City. Furthermore, the club house will be privately financed, built, owned and operated by South Mountain
Development, and therefore should MQ1 be a part of the funding.
Sincerely,
David KJ
Chairman
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah
cncls,
cc:

County CotnmisMorieT, Rainfy
County Commissioner, Mary Cailaghan
Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short
4777 COMMERCE DRIVE<. MURRAY, UTAH - M107 - (SOI) 2«-0420-FAX(B0i)2«-1377
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County may be sued over golf-course data
ByZackVanEyck
Deseret News staff writer
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is
threatening to go back to court to
force Salt Lake County to release
cost estimates for the Draper golf
course the county may purchase.
If the county decides to buy the
18-hole South Mountain course,
the nonprofit organization might
also amend its March 28 lawsuit
and ask that a 3rd District Court
judge require the county to put
construction of the golf course
through the competitive bid process.
David K. Mast, a Draper resident and chairman of the group,
said the actions are being considered nowbecause the county released only a portion of the
information the group requested

through the Government Records
Access and Management Act After requesting two extensions on
the group's request, Mast said the
county finally turned over documents related to the golf course—
but with the dollar amounts
blacked out.
Mast also is upset because none
of the correspondence from South
Mountain to county officials was
released. Commissioner Randy
Horiuchi said Monday the county
still is considering whether to
make the letters public.
Mast contends the county could
end up paying millions of dollars
more than necessary for the course
but said the public can't make that
evaluation without the cost estimates given to the county by South
Mountain.

record if the developers sign a deal
with the county. South Mountain's
artners want to donate the land to
• ^They're making a deal behind
le county but have the county pay
closed doors where it can't be scru- them to build the course, which
tinized," Mast said. "(South MounDiehl said is now 65 percent.
tain's developers) are saying, 4OK, complete.
we've got a great deal for you.
"What we told the county is,
We're going to donate the property 'Until we have a signed contract,
but you will have to reimburse us
everything we give you is confidenbetween $8 and $12 million for the tial and proprietary,'" Diehl said.
golf course' — a golf course that
"Let's say we don't sign a contract
should cost only $3 to $4 million."
with the county and it doesn't go
. On Wednesday the Salt Lake
forward, we don't think all our
County Recreation Board and the
stuff should be public.
Golf Advisory Board will hold a
"We're not trying to be difficult
joint public hearing on the prowith Dave Mast or anybody in
posed acquisition of the South
particular."
Mountain course. The hearing will
Horiuchi said the county bebegin at noon at Meadowbrook
lieves it can purchase the South
Golf Course, 4197 S. 1300 West in
Mountain course without going
Murray.
through a competitive bid process
Terry Diehl, a South Mountain
because it would be buying a compartner, said all communications
pleted course, not starting a
project from scratch.
would become part of the public
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Suyiiig Draper Golf Course a Bad Deal,
By Jon Ure
THE 8ALT LAKE TRIBUNE

A 20-year golf professional who
uilds and operates courses
laims Salt Lake County will rip
ff taxpayers if it acquires an 18*
tole, $8 million golf course on
Paper's South Mountain.
<
' Jim Blair,: co-owner of Mulli;an's Golf and Games in Ogden
md Riverton; said he will oppose
he deal at a public hearing on the
proposal today at noon in the*
VIeadow Brook Golf Course clubhouse!
4197 S.,1300 West.
:
He has Joined with Dave Mast,
chairman of Concerned Taxpayer's .6f Utah, in opposing the purchase. Both say, South Mountain's
$8 million price tag is ridiculous,
pmd by their reckoning, the county^ should, pay rno, more, than $4
Million.

•

•;.

;;JMast's group has filed a lawsuit
to prevent the transaction. He

>
o
o

said South Mountain's developers
and the Salt Lake County Commission are engaged in a sweetheart deal and complained that
his freedom of information requests for county and South
Mountain documents regarding
the proposed purchase are being
• illegally thwarted.
f/« The $8 million figure does not
Include a clubhouse on the course
. in the middle of South Mountain's
* 1,700 residences. Blair and Mast
said other golf courses in the
. area, including those superior to
South Mountain's, cost half that
much.

And if Sotith Mountain is donating the land, why will it cost the
county the whole $8 million?
asked Blair. Blair also wanted to
know why the county should own
and operate it.
Terry Diehl, a partner in the
South Mountain development,
said Blair is upset because he
can't sell his golf facility to the
county. And South Mountain's
correspondence with the county is
confidential because a contract
has yet to be signed, Diehl added.
"Jimmy Blair doesn't know
what he's talking about," Diehl
said. "I'm sure he hasn't been up

Says Golf Professional
to the site. We're moving 2.5 million yards of dirt and he knows we
can't do it for what he's saying. •
We've got this huge expense that
you don't get on a flat golf course.
"He just wants to sell his deal to
the county,'! Diehl said. "That's
the whole motivation."
Blair acknowledged he would
like to sell his 3-par golf course to
the county, but the county has no
need for it. He denies that his opposition to the South Mountain
deal involves ulterior motives.
"I'm no competition at all,"
Blair said. "I'm a concerned taxpayer and they're making a kill-

ing on this deal. People shouldn't
be retiring on this. It makes no
sense. That golf course is worth
between
$3 million and $4 million.0 .
He added that Jeremy Ranch
sold three years ago for $3.2 million with a clubhouse and Park
Meadows sold four years ago for
• $4.1 million. .
Gleh Lu, director of Salt Lake
County Recreation, defended the
$8 million price tag. The Old Mill
course, he noted, will cost around
$11 million and that does not include some 30 acres of the land
needed there.

Salt Lake County Commission
Chairman Brent Overson wants a
public golf course in the area that
will pay its way, perhaps become
profitable and go easy on the sensitive hillside.
"It's not like the commissioners
went out and cut a deal," Overson
said. South Mountain's plan was
picked from a list of three by the
county's Golf Advisory Board.
And since the county approached
South Mountain, competitive bids
were never even a notion, added
Diehl.
South Mountain also plans a 60bed bed and breakfast, a restaurant with banquet facilities and a
clubhouse with cart storage!
Some 50 townhouse condominiums will also be built nearby.
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Monday, October 28, 1996

CO-FOUNDER OF TAXPAYERS GROUP USES MONEY,
MIGHT AND LAWSUITS TO MAKE PUBLIC OFFICIALS
TOE THE LINE
By Zack Van Eyck, Staff Writer
You've heard of the Answer Man? He's the Question Man. You're familiar with the Lawman? He's the
Lawsuit-man.
He's developer David K. Mast - wealthy, confident and just as likely to take legal action as he is to speak
his mind, both of which he does often. He's been more than just a thorn in the side of some Utah public
officials - more like a harpoon. And he's hardly apologetic.
The 44-year-old Salt Lake County native, co-founder and chairman of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, has
publicly challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority, the Utah Transit Authority, Micron, Salt Lake
County, the city of Draper and even the National Basketball Association.
Most recently, Mast charged Draper City Councilman Lyn Kimball and Mayor Elaine Redd with conflicts
of interest because they are buying lots in the South Mountain development. Kimball admitted a conflict
and has since refrained from voting on South Mountain issues.
Earlier this year, his group challenged the proposed county purchase of the South Mountain golf course,
filing a lawsuit and placing a full-page ad in local papers. Mast accused Commission Chairman Brent
Overson of breaking the law by holding secret meetings with South Mountain representatives. Overson
called the allegations "misstatements and bare-faced lies."
Mast regularly confronts the Draper City Council in public meetings. He said his willingness to take on
City Hall has prompted "over 100 calls" from residents asking him to run for mayor next year, an idea he
is considering.
"They probably look at me as a radical," Mast said of city officials. "They feel uncomfortable around me
because they know I will bring it to the residents of Draper's attention that they've made mistakes.
" I just feel Pm in a position that I can not only say something about an issue but I can do something
about it. I have money. I can put ads in papers. I can litigate if I have to."
Mast, who has lost track of how many lawsuits he's filed in his lifetime, has already filed one suit against
Draper this year and plans to file another. He said he began using litigation as a way to solve problems as
a general contractor on military projects. Government staffers told him to work for a lesser fee, then sue
to get what he should have been paid. He continues to rely on the legal system because it is the only way
E 0 0
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to "know the whole story."
Mast himself has been accused of distorting the facts and exaggerating, but even former adversaries
respect him. Chuck Akerlow, who went to arbitration with Mast to settle a dispute about a road Akerlow
hired him to build for the Centennial development, said Mast is "a very bright guy."
"Whether you agree with his political views or not, he is at least a person who has the courage to express
them and do something about them," Aker-low said. "He's good for this community. There needs to be
more people who stand up and make public officials account for what they!re doing."
Mast said his taxpayers organization has more than 100 members and is not simply a front for his own
views, as Overson has asserted. He does fund most of the group's endeavors, however.
And because Mast stands to make about $9 million from his Draper Heights subdivision, the group's
efforts aren't likely to subside. And Mast wouldn't have much trouble funding a mayoral campaign.
© 1995 Deseret News Publishing Co.
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